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THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
LOCHNER v. NEW YORK REVISITED
D.

GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.t

I.

INTRODUCTION

N THE CONTROVERSIAL CASE of Lochner v. New York,'
the United States Supreme Court set aside a state statute 2 restricting
bakers to a 10-hour maximum workday. Although favorable comment
upon Lochner was not totally lacking,' the decision has probably received
"more clearly unanimous criticism than any other in the twentieth
century."4 A socialist organ of the day referred to Lochner as "a new
Dred Scott decision," ' and 85,000 bakers threatened a strike and a
bread famine, 6 vowing to "fight all along the line" 7 if provisions for
the hours restriction were dropped from their labor contracts. Lochner
sounded the Court's call to battle against social and economic regulatory
t Associate Professor, Department of Government, Franklin and Marshall College. B.A., Davidson College, 1964; M.A., Princeton, 1966; Ph.D., Princeton, 1967.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Act of May 13, 1897, art. 8, ch. 415, § 110 [1897] N.Y. Laws 118. Section 110
provided as follows:
No employee shall be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake
bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or
more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter
work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will
make an average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such week
in which such employee shall work.
Id.
3. The New York Times, for example, noted the following in an editorial
comment:
It is most gratifying to observe that the Supreme Court does not allow the sanctity
of any contracts which may have been made between the demagogues in the Legislature and the ignoramuses among the labor leaders in bringing to naught their
combined machinations.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1905, at 10, col. 3. A legal journal considered the decision
"sound .. .and salutary .. . an effective check to unwarranted interference with the
freedom of contract which seems to have been really needed." 67 ALB. L.J. 129 (1905).
Another journal stated:
In this day, when great, complex business organizations and even the demands
of socialism have served to obscure the individual and his superior rights in the
community, it is a great relief to have some strong arm of the government arrest
the obstructing causes and reassert, in unambiguous terms, the supremacy of the
individual, the great unit of civilization.
60 CENT. L.J. 401 (1905).
4. R. McCLOSKEY, TnE MODERN SUPREME COURT 279 (1972).
5. The Worker, May 22, 1905, at 1.
6. N.Y. World, Apr. 18, 1905, at 8.
7. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1905, at 1, col. 3.

(217)
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legislation,8 and sparked further interest in reform of the courts9 in
those who felt that judicial power was surging unchecked. 10
The intervening years have been no kinder to Lochner. The decision embraced a policy which subsequent events shortly rendered obsolete, and it has become the 20th century archetype of a judicial mistake. 1
Posterity may record the sole good resulting from Justice Peckham's
opinion for the majority to have been wholly inadvertent, for it was
in a dissent to the Lochner decision that Justice Holmes penned one
of the most memorable opinions of his long legal career. 12 Nonetheless,
even ignoble decisions have been known to possess utility, and Lochner
especially offers a glimpse of the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional change.
Constitutional change includes more than changes in the meaning
of the document itself. One commentator has stated:
[The Constitution] can only be that Aristotelian concept of the
constituting idea or body of ideas which lies within the political
system and, indeed, within the society generally and which by its
presence qualifies the society and its political system to become a
cohesive entity. To "define" the Constitution, understood in this
8. See C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 672 (2d ed. 1968).
9. See generally H. DAVIS, THE JUDICIAL VETO (1914); A. MASON,
HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE

(1964);

WILLIAM

G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

1900-1912 (1958); H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1956); Boudin, Government
by Judiciary, 26 POL. Sci. Q. 238 (1911) ; Dodd, Social Legislation and the Courts,
28 POL. ScI. Q. 1 (1913); Dodd, The Growth of Judicial Power, 24 POL. ScI. Q.
193 (1909).
10. President Theodore Roosevelt was among those strongly opposed to the posi-

tion assumed by the Lochner Court; in correspondence with Justice Day, he commented:
If the spirit which lies behind [Lochner v. New York] obtained in all the actions
of the Federal and State Courts, we should not only have a revolution, but it
would be absolutely necessary to have a revolution, because the condition of the
worker would become intolerable.
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to W.R. Day, Jan. 11, 1908, in 6 LETTERS OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 904 (E. Morison ed. 1951). Lochner may have prompted President Roosevelt's observation that American judges often "fail to understand and apply the needed

remedies for the new wrongs produced by the new and highly complex social and
industrial civilization which has grown up in the last half-century." 15 T. ROOSEVELT,
STATE PAPERS 508 (1926).
11. Dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Black
criticized the concurring opinions of Justices White and Goldberg for their "reliance
upon the natural law due process philosophy found in Lochner v. New York . . .
along with ... other long discredited decisions . . . ." Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist took Justice Blackmun to task upon

much the same ground in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973)

(Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).

12. See 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes dissented on the
ground that the majority opinion had been decided upon the particular economic
theory espoused by the court, without the deference traditionally accorded to legisla-

tive decisions. He asserted that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire." Id. at 75.
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sense, is to "perceive" it hidden in the texture and traditions, the
daily practices and great documents, of the society."3
In the American system of government, the principal task of constitutional interpretation has fallen to the Supreme Court. Through its
role as supreme interpreter, the Court necessarily becomes an agent of
constitutional change. This role has at times been actively sought by
the Court; in some cases, however, it is thrust upon the Court by
political necessity.

14

At its most fundamental level, constitutional interpretation occurs
when the Court assigns meaning to words and phrases in the document.
However, assigning such meanings requires the Court to sit in continuing accommodation between norms and public policy. Often, it
must choose among competing values or norms in arriving at an interpretation of the document, and the choice of norms effectively states
a policy. Provided the policy choice is sufficiently ratified by other
agencies of government and by the citizenry, the Court has effected an
allocation of political power. Thus, -the document itself is much less
central to an understanding of American constitutional law than are
the cases in which the Constitution has been construed. Indeed, one
commentator has -noted that "Justices who look to the Constitution
for more than a puzzling, if majestic, phrase might just as well turn
to the comic strips for all the guidance they will find on how to decide
most of the great cases that involve national policy."'"
In this process of accommodation between norms and policy,
the Court may adjust policy to conform with chosen norms by voiding
a statute, as was done in Lochner, or it may modify the values contained in prior decisions to legitimize a policy which represents a
departure from previously accepted practices. It often appears that
the aim of opinion writing is to obscure the fact of modification so that
new developments seem to effect little or no doctrinal change. This
process, of course, results in an "amendment" of the document through
interpretation.
Whether the Supreme Court rejects or approves a certain policy,
it participates in constitutional change. The Court, for example, expressed constitutional norms to approve particular manifestations of
racial discrimination in the 19th century,' 6 only later to subscribe to
13. H. ROELOFS, THE LANGUAGE OF MODERN POLITICS 130-31 (1967).
14. See Stephenson, "The Mild Magistracy of the Law": United States v. Richard
Nixon, 103 INTELLECT 288 (1975).
15. L. LEVY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1966).

16. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) ; Hall v. DcCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877)
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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different norms which in turn required massive redirections of public
policy in the 20th century.'7 Often, 'the norms themselves develop as
the policy develops. Full elaboration of the contract clause,' for
instance, did not come with Fletcher v. Peck, 9 but rather appeared
gradually in response to the developing policy in the states concerning
the sanctity of private contracts. 20 A similar process was reflected in
the policy of the commerce clause. 21 A century later constitutional
response to the "white primary" evolved coterminously with the inventiveness of the state legislatures and political parties.2 2 Thus
questions regarding the legitimacy of a policy tend to evoke the statement of a constitutional norm; this is true despite the fact that a
principal ingredient of judicial power in this country has in some
instances been the avoidance of such a statement.23
This process of accommodation suggests an interplay among three
primary factors: economic and social developments, responses to these
17. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

19. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
20. See S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (1971).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, THE
CLAUSE (1937).

COMMERCE

22. During the first half of the 20th century, the South was basically a one

political party region, and hence the primary was considered to be more important
than the general election. In United States v. Newberry, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), the
Supreme Court held that primaries were not "elections" within the meaning of the
Constitution, thus permitting the states total control in this area. As a result Southern
States used various methods to ensure that only whites voted in the primaries. See
generally Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941); Grovey v. Townsend, 294 U.S. 699 (1935) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS
625-43 (1949) ; Marshall, The Rise and Collapse of the "White Democratic Primary,"
26 J. NEGRO ED. 249 (1957); Weeks, The White Primary: 1944-1948, 42 AM. POL.
ScI. Rrv. 500 (1948).

23. A classic example of judicial self-restraint through the political question doctrine is Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1
(1849). The mootness doctrine offers another route of escape or of delay. See, e.g.,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
The Court has also declined to hear cases on the ground that the party seeking relief lacks standing to sue. The Court requires that the plaintiff allege "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" in order to assure "that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) ; Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 450 (1970).

Still another method of judicial avoidance is the ripeness doctrine. Since
federal courts do not render advisory opinions, before a constitutional issue will be
adjudicated, concrete legal issues must be presented and the interest of the litigants
must be such that they require protection against actual interference with their rights.
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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developments by the executive and legislative branches of government,
and judicial response to the combination of the first two factors. Thus,
the Supreme Court may disallow a particular policy selected by the
political departments to cope with economic developments. In the
Income Tax cases, 24 for example, the Court chose to block a policy
agreed upon by the Congress and the President to alter the tax base
of the national budget. Alternatively, the Court may choose to give
a positive thrust to its decision by requiring the other branches to
confront and respond to a social issue in a certain mode; for instance,
as the population shifted in the first half of this century from the rural
areas to the cities and suburbs, the Court found it necessary to react
to a political impasse by mandating others to act where they had chosen
to do nothing.25 Further constitutional change may result when the
political departments respond to judicial decisions, as the sequel to
2
the Income Tax decisions would suggest. 1
It is in viewing constitutional interpretation as an accommodation
between norms and policy that Lochner is instructive of the role of
the Supreme Court in constitutional change. This is so even though
the Lochner majority explicitly refused to approve constitutional change
of considerable magnitude. For Lochner in reality presented -the Court
with more than the question of whether the fourteenth amendment
permitted a state to restrict the working hours of bakers. The Lochner
litigation was one of the first opportunities presented for constitutional
confirmation of the modern regulatory state. Debate over the constitutionality of the New York statute symbolized the broader dispute
over fundamental changes in the fabric of the American polity.
Other accounts have comprehensively ,treated the relative merits
of the opposing positions in Lochner, as well as the various visions
of judicial duty which the Justices' opinions reveal.
The purpose
24. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The statute under attack in
Pollock imposed a 2% income tax on income derived from any type of property, rents,
dividends, or salaries. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 509. The
Supreme Court, in two hearings, held that the tax on income from real and personal
property was a direct tax and was violative of the constitutional prohibition against
direct federal taxes. 157 U.S. at 583; 158 U.S. at 628. The Court also found that the
tax on municipal bonds was violative of the principle of separation of powers, and
that without these taxes, which were a substantial component of the congressional
scheme, the income tax as a whole was void. Id. at 630.
25. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. Congressional response culminated in the adoption of the sixteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
27. See generally L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1877-1917 (1971); E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948) ; C. VOSE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT
SINCE 1900 (1972); Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48

(1938) ; Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21

HARV.

LITIGATION

ETHICS 269
L. REv. 495
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of this study of Lochner, however, is to determine how the membership of the Court approached the proposed change and to outline those
factors which may have precipitated the decision. These factors in
turn suggest some conclusions concerning the Supreme Court's participation in the process of constitutional change.
II.

THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A.

The Traditional Theory

In resolving a particular controversy a court is required to choose
from a plethora of societal values those which will guide its policy
formulation. The Lochner Court rendered its decision in a time of
rapid social and economic change; there were no clearly developed
norms to guide government in its response to social and economic
problems which were essentially an outgrowth of the industrial expansion and rapid population growth of the late 19th century. In
some segments of society, governmental regulation of private affairs
was deemed a grave offense against citizens. Thus, one proponent of
the laissez-faire philosophy remarked:
God has bestowed upon us certain powers and gifts which no one
is at liberty to take from us or to interfere with .... All attempts

to deprive [persons] of them, [would be] theft. Under the same
deprive us of the right to earn
head may be placed all purposes to
28
property or to use it as we see fit.

Concentrations of capital spawned combinations of labor, and changes
in the economic order tested the validity of established laissez-faire
policies.

29

However, even the early labor leaders in their campaigns to

improve the lot of the workingman espoused the traditional view. They
maintained that workers should organize to gain a larger share of
profits, but should avoid excessive reliance upon the assistance of the
state.30 The sentiment in favor of general hours legislation within the
American Federation of Labor "was by no means unanimous ...
While ,the constitutionality of an inclusive eight-hour law remained
somewhat in doubt, there is no ground for thinking that it was the
(1908); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Powell, The Logic
and Rhetoric of ConstitutionalLaw, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCH. & Sci. METH. 645 (1918);
Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973).

28. J. McCosH, OUR MORAL NATURE 40 (1892), quoted in R. GABRIEL, THE
COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 156 (2d ed. 1956).
29. For a discussion of laissez-faire thought, see R. GABRIEL, supra note 28, at
155-85; A. MASON, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING 574-639, 690-723 (3d ed. 1965).
30. See J. COMMONS & J. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 116 (4th
rev. ed. 1936); E. LEWIS, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO THE WORLD WAR 261 (1937).
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courts which were retarding this kind of legislation."'3 The public
generally disapproved of active participation by government in the
economic affairs of the day. Such intervention as was tolerated was
justified on grounds that certain instances of government regulation
would serve one of three purposes: 1) provide conditions required for
economic development (tariffs and antimonopolistic legislation) ;32 2)
protect workers in dangerous occupations ;13 and 3) care for those who
were not sui juris, and could not care for themselves.8 4 But even within
those narrow categories, vast differences of opinion existed concerning
the propriety of government intervention.
The theory of economic individualism, applied to burgeoning industrialization, bespoke the simplicities of an earlier day. When the
practice was threatened, however, its defenders appeared. 3 It was not

surprising, therefore, that legal doctrines such as the 14th amendment
right to make a contract, which was controlling in Lochner,0 developed
in response to the expanding regulatory efforts of government. That
such reactionary behavior often accompanies rapid change has been
noted in another context:
Extreme orthodoxy betrays by its very frenzy that the poison of
skepticism has entered the soul of the church; for men insist
most vehemently upon their certainties when their hold upon them
has been
shaken. Frantic orthodoxy is a method for obscuring
7
doubt.3

As an exercise in pure self-interest, the doctrines were useful
for any business or profession seeking to avoid government intervention
in its operations.
The advocates of economic individualism acquired support to the
degree that their theories coalesced with constitutionalism. Gradually
the doctrines of economic individualism were absorbed into federal law
through decisions of the Supreme Court."8 This constitutional develop31. Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in 3 A HISTORY
STATES

OF LABOUR IN THE

UNITED

556, 558 (J. Commons ed. 1935).

32. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
33. Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 HARv. L.
REv. 353, 357-59 (1916). See also notes 59-464 and accompanying text infra.
34. C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 187 n.59 (1954) ; Frankfurter,
supra note 33, at 354-57, 363. See also Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W.
421 (1902).
35. See generally J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOm IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY

UNITED STATES

(1956).

36. 198 U.S. at 64.
37. R.

NIEBUHR,

DOES CIVILIZATION

NEED RELIGION 2-3 (1927).

The federal

and state cases which carried the thrust of economic individualism into American law
are reviewed in C. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 19-167.

38. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) ; Butcher's Union Slaughterhouse
& Livestock Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughterhouse Co., 111 U.S. 746
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ment indicated not only that the individual Justices were receptive in
varying degrees to a particular conception of the state, but also that
some of them were quite willing to assume the burdens of writing
these conceptions into the fundamental law of the land. There was, of
course, an alternative available to the Justices. A judge can embrace
certain values without also choosing to implement them in a manner
contrary to the determinations of the legislature. It is the availability
of this option which underlies the continuing debate concerning the
wisdom of judicial activism versus judicial restraint.89 Justice Holmes,
for example, remained skeptical of governmental incursions in-to the
economic and social realm, yet he refrained from invalidating legislative
efforts in that direction.

B.

40

Modification of the Tradition

Social Darwinism dominated political thought at the turn of the
century, and formed the basis for the negative attitude toward governmental intervention in the economic affairs of the day. 1 Private
ownership of property, rugged individualism, and the accumulation of
wealth through fierce competitive struggle in the market place formed
the foundation of Social Darwinism. 42 The process of natural selection
was thought to produce superior leaders for the capitalist society, and
it was advocated by most of the influential leaders during this period.
Andrew Carnegie, a product of the selection process and one of its
staunchest defenders, commented:
[W]hether the law [of competition] be benign or not . . . no

substitutes have been found; and while the law may sometimes be
hard on the individual it is best for the race, because it ensures
the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and
welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate
ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration of
business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few. . .. "
(1884). See also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887). The most complete account of this process is contained in
B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
39. The dilemma has plagued the judiciary throughout American history. For
instance, the Supreme Court's entanglement in the politics of civil liberties was probably unavoidable. "The American judge is dragged in spite of himself onto the
political field." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 93 (J. Mayer & M.
Lerner eds. 1966). Nonetheless, the Court need not have assumed an activist role in
defining, developing and extending those liberties.

40. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski, March 1, 1924, in 1
HOLMEs-LAsKI LETTERS 597 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
41. R. GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 155-64, 167. See generally R. HOFSTADTER,
SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1959).
42. R. GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 159.
43. Carnegie, Wealth, N. AM. REv. 661 (1889), quoted in R. GABRIEL, supra
note 28, at 159.
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The inequities inherent in the operation of Social Darwinism were evident even to its most enthusiastic advocates; they concluded, however,
that its benefits outweighed the harsh results it produced. Others, who
came to be known as Populists, Progressives, Socialists or radicals,
sought protection for those defeated in the economic struggle, and concluded that government intervention might prove beneficial, and that
the government might alter the prevailing social and economic order
to produce a better day for all.
Each of these groups, despite the sharp differences amongst them,
proposed a definite role for government in meeting the perceived ills
of the day.4 4 This opposition in many instances seemed to be as con-

cerned with the concentrations of labor as with the concentrations of
capital.45 The central theme in Progressivism was a revolt "against
the industrial discipline: the Progressive movement was the complaint
of the unorganized against the consequences of organization."4
At the same time, crosscurrents and contradictions were present
throughout these divisions. Those favoring the maintenance of economic individualism were themselves at odds over the question of how
much government regulation was too much. 47 Strict logical application
of principle would lead to results where politics would not follow.
Few were prepared to support, for example, the British social philosopher Herbert Spencer's insistence that all government relief and
4s
assistance programs were evil.
Complicating the picture considerably were those business groups
whose practices were inconsistent with the professions of the Gilded
Age. The railroads, for example, accepted - perhaps actively
sought - government regulation, if it were to their advantage, in
order "to establish stability and control within the . . . industry so

that [they] could prosper without the fearful consequences of cutsupra note 29, at 640-723.
45. This phenomenon was explained by one commentator as follows:
A few progressives, of course, hailed the rise of labor unions as an advance in
democracy. But the majority, while sincerely desirous of improving the plight
of the individual workingman, was perhaps basically more hostile to the union
than to corporate monopoly. If the progressive attention was mostly centered on
the corporation during the decade, it was largely because the sheer social power
of the corporation vastly overshadowed that of the rising but still relatively
weak unions.
G. MowRY, supra note 9, at 103.
46. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFoR 216 (1955).
47. For a survey, see Brown, Police Power - Legislation for Health and Per44.

A. MASON,

sonal Safety, 42 HARV. L. REv. 866 (1929).

48. "Spencer deplored not only poor laws, but also state-supported education,

sanitary supervision . . . regulation of housing conditions, and even state protection
of the ignorant from medical quacks." R. HOrST.DMm,
supra note 41, at 41.
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throat competition." 4 9 Even the earlier attempts at rate regulation,
such as those litigated in Munn v. Illinois" and companion cases, 5'
while opposed by the railroads themselves, were supported politically
by the more traditional mercantile interests of the day.5 2 The irony
was too apparent for a trade publication of 1885 to overlook:
It is noticeable that there are more advocates of Government
interference than heretofore, and that the applicants no longer
represent one single interest ...
Thus the curious spectacle is presented of friend and opponent
alike pleading for redress at the hands of the Government. The
mercantile community ask that violent fluctuations in rates be
done away with, that drawbacks and rebates be made impossible,
that no more be charged for a long haul than a short one, that
discrimination be abolished, that diversion of freight be no longer
permitted, and that various other grievances, real or imaginary, be
attended to. The railroads too, now look to the Government to
help them out of their difficulties. They want to see to it that no
road does business for less than cost, that minimum rates be
fixed by law, that pools and combinations be legalized, that the
building of parallel and competing lines be in some way protected
against the competition of bankrupt roads. Finally, there come the
investors in railroad property - stockholders and bondholders who ask for much the same thing, but in addition want a remedy
against speculative directors and managers, some provision against
an impairment of their investment either by parties without or
within, statutes enforcing their rights and privileges, protection
of the minority against the majority, a guarantee against unfair
leases or leases or other arrangements made by directors without
the consent of stockholders, and so on ad infinitum. . . . In a
word, merchants want to be protected against the railroads, the
railroads want to be protected against themselves, and investors
all cry for the same soothing syrup
against both. And they
53
legislative enactment.
Thus even the faithful among the economic individualists condoned
government intervention whenever it was perceived to be in their own
interest. To the degree that the Supreme Court hampered the early
49. G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, 238 (1965).
50. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
51. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 194 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P.R.R. v. Ackley,
94 U.S. 179 (1877); Wiona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877) ; Stone v.
Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877).
52. See G. MILLER, RAILROADS AW1DTHE GRANGER LAWS 196-97 (1971). See also
Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose
in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn
eds. 1971).

53. Government Control of Railroads,17 Com. & FIN.
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development of regulatory bodies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, 4 it can be argued that the Court was hardly pro-business
in its outlook but rather that it was paying heed to an ideology discarded by those whom the constitutional norms purported to serve.
C.

The Lochner Litigation

As described above, the normative atmosphere in which the
Lochner litigation was to be resolved was shifting. The New York
statute met the opposition it did precisely because it moved beyond
the perimeter of facile acceptability at -that time.55 It was surely not a
matter of judicial animosity for the baking vocation or a belief that
bakers ought necessarily to work long hours. The gravamen lay
elsewhere. The statute simply transgressed an undefined line of propriety by proposing state regulation of the working conditions of a
group that seemed little different from most others in society. Viewed
in this way, the statute represented a radical departure from approved
standards and suggested the advent of an altogether different kind of
polity. A state-imposed limit on hours for bakers signaled a shift from
laissez-faire thought to a form of capitalism where major economic
interests would attempt to employ government power to regulate
economic relationships which could not or would not be controlled by
voluntary or non-political means. 56 One would seek to achieve by
political decision that which previously would have been left to the
ordinary workings of the market. Justice Peckham's vision in Lochner
was only slightly imperfect:
It is unfortunately true that labor, even in. any department, may
possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all,
on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities? A printer,
a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods
clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's, or a physician's clerk, or a clerk in
almost any kind of business, would all come under the power of
the legislature, on this assumption. No trade, no occupation, no
mode of earning one's living, could escape this all-pervading power,
and the acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of labor in
all employments would be valid, although such limitation might
seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and
his family....
54. E.g., ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897); ICC v. Cincinnati,
N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
55. See notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
56. While some government involvement was deemed desirable, much of the literature of the period reflects a fear of too much government involvement. See, e.g.,
G. BOLEN, GETTING A LIVING (1903); ALGER, Some Equivocal Rights of Labor, 97
ATL. MONTHLY 364 (1906).
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It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument, that
it is to the interest of the State that its population should be strong
and robust, and therefore any legislation which may be said to
tend to make people healthy must be valid as health laws, enacted
under the police power. If this be a valid argument and a justification for this kind of legislation, it follows that the protection of
the Federal Constitution from undue interference with liberty
of person and freedom of contract is visionary, wherever the law
is sought to be justified as a valid exercise of the police power.
Scarcely any law but might find shelter under such assumptions,
and conduct, properly so called, as well as contract, would come
under 'the restrictive sway of the legislature. Not only the hours
of employ~s, but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes
and artisans, could be forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies
by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the fighting strength of the
State be impaired. We mention these extreme cases because the
contention is extreme. We do not believe in the soundness of the
views which uphold this law. 7
It was as if Justice Peckham and four of his brethren had looked
across the chasm and dared not proceed. For those whose thought
was once largely part of a mainstream which economic events were fast
driving into a backwater, the statute simply went too far. The constitutional theory of the time offered little guidance in evaluating such
a controversial law. This theory embraced a firm policy - non-intervention by government in the economy - yet was subject to a variety
of exceptions which had been carved out on an ad hoc basis."
One of the exceptions to laissez-faire policy permitted government
regulation of dangerous occupations. Seven years prior to Lochner the
0 had upheld a state
Supreme Court in Holden v. Hardy,"
statue which
provided for a limit on the workday of miners, despite arguments that
it amounted to an unlawful exercise of the police power.6 0 In argument
before the Court, counsel for the State of Utah had defended the legislation on the same ground that had prevailed in the lower courts : the
health hazards of mining. Counsel stressed the "unusual danger to the
health and safety of those employed therein," 62 and reviewed legislative
investigations of hospital records and health statistics.6" Even those
economic individualist die-hards who doubted the wisdom of this law
57. 198 U.S. at 59-61.
58. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.

59. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
60. Id.

61. See Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, 46 P.756 (1896), aff'd, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
62. Brief for Defendant at 8.
63. Id.
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conceded that regulatory legislation was necessary where an occupation
was hazardous to health.64
Speaking for the Holden majority, Justice Henry Billings Brown
agreed:
This right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain
limitations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise
of its police powers. While this power is inherent in all governments, it has doubtless been greatly expanded in its application
during the past century, owing to an enormous increase in the
number of occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental
to the health of employ6s as to demand special precaution for their
well-being and protection, or the safety of adjacent property. While
this court has held ... that the police power cannot be put forward

as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation, it may be
lawfully resorted to for the purpose of preserving -the public
health, safety or morals, or the abatement of public nuisances ....
Upon the principles above stated, we think the act in question
may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. The enactment does not profess to limit the hours of all
workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground
mines .

.

.

. These employments, when too long pursued, the

legislature has judged
employ~s, and, so long
lieving that this is so,
reviewed by the Federal

to be detrimental to the health of the
as there are reasonable grounds for beits decision upon this subject cannot be
courts.6"

The law as expounded by Justice Brown harmonized with the bulk
of state court decisions of the day on such questions. Hours legislation
had generally been approved only when some special need for it had
66
been convincingly demonstrated.
The failure to demonstrate such a need proved to be the undoing
of the hours limitation in Lochner. Indeed, the burden of the state
was that of making a baker's occupation appear sufficiently extraordinary to justify legal restrictions on the workday. This potential
constitutional basis was so tenuous that at each of the three appellate
hearings on the validity of the legislation the outcome was decided by
a single vote.
In the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
the constitutionality of the statute was approved by a vote of three to
64. Record at 11.
65. 169 U.S. at 391-92, 395 (citations omitted). Justices Brewer and Peckham
dissented without opinion.
66. For an excellent review of the statutes challenged dmring this period, see
Frankfurter, supra note 33.
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Justice Davy, speaking for the majority, was impressed with
the health hazards bakers were required to endure:
When we consider the intense heat of the rooms where baking
is done, and the flour that floats in the air and is breathed by
those who work in bakeries, there can be but little doubt that
prolonged labor day and night, subject to these conditions, might
produce a diseased condition of the human system so that the
employees would not be capable of doing their work well and
supplying the public with wholesome food.68
In the New York Court of Appeals, where the statute was sustained four votes to three,69 Judge Parker's majority opinion noted that
bakers were frequently classified by medical authorities with "potters,
stone cutters, file grinders, and other workers whose occupation necessitates the inhalation of dust particles." 7 ° Published medical opinion,
Judge Parker thought, fully justified the statutory provisions under
review. 7'
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gray expressed his willingness
to uphold the statute because the hours provision was part of a general
statute setting standards of cleanliness and safety in the industry. Had
the restriction of working hours stood alone however, in his view it
would have violated the right of contract.72
Similar doubts were expressed in the dissenting opinions which
were subsequently endorsed by five Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. In dissent, Judge O'Brien maintained:
[The law had] no relation whatever to the subject of health ...
[Its] real object was to regulate the hours of labor between master
and servant in a business which is private and not dangerous to
morals or to health .... [T] he making of bread is one of the most

common employments."
Judge Bartlett, dissenting, explicitly rejected the medical statistics
upon which others had relied. He asserted that
the baker, like the cooks in hotels, restaurants and private families,
has provided for him in his business flour, sugar and the other
67.
68.
69.
70.

People v. Lochner, 73 App. Div. 120 (1902).
Id. at 128.
People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145, 69 N.E. 373 (1904).
Id. at 165, 69 N.E. at 380. However, it was in Judge Vann's concurring

opinion that these authorities received full mention. Judge Vann reminded the
legislators that their authority to establish health regulations was limited by the court's
determination "whether the act has a fair, just, and reasonable relation to the general
welfare." Id. at 168, 69 N.E. at 382 (Vann, J., concurring). Judge Vann considered
the evidence persuasive and cited data from several medical and other studies concerning the health hazards of baking. Id. at 170-74, 69 N.E. at 382-84.
71. Id. at 165, 69 N.E. at 380-81.
72. Id. at 166, 69 N.E. at 381 (Gray, J.,concurring).
73. Id. at 183, 186, 69 N.E. at 387-88 (O'Brien, J.,dissenting).
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ingredients duly prepared for immediate use. The claim that the
compounding of these constituents is an unhealthy occupation,
will surprise the bakers and good housewives of the State. The
grinding of steel ... and of other similar materials and substances,

causing clouds of impalpable dust, is not to be confounded with
the avocation of the family baker engaged in the . . . labor of
producing ... commodities more calculated to cause dyspepsia in

the consumer than consumption in the manufacturer. 7

In Judge Bartlett's opinion, the statute proposed an extension of the
recognized exceptions to laissez-faire policies beyond their intended
limits. 75

When Lochner reached the United States Supreme Court a year
later, it appeared that the Justices' perceptions of the baker's working
conditions were crucial to the outcome of the case. Counsel for the
state did not reflect this concern in the quality of his argument, however, since the state's brief contained no citation -to medical or other
authorities regarding the hazards of the profession, and failed to demonstrate any real health justification for the legislation. In short, counsel
offered no reason for concluding that the baker's calling was different,
for health purposes, from any other. Rather, the state's case rested
upon the assertion that the legislature had found an existing need, and
that prior cases supported a finding that the regulatory enactment
was a lawful exercise of the state's police power.7 6
In contrast, counsel for Joseph Lochner and, indirectly, for the
other master bakers in New York, understood precisely the message
from the lower courts and correspondingly seized the occasion to
demonstrate that the hours of labor and the health of the employee were
only remotely related at best. Appellant's counsel concluded:
[A]n extensive leisure of the employees [is] more dangerous to
their health in both a physical and moral sense, than correspond74. Id. at 187-88, 69 N.E. at 389 (Bartlett, J., dissenting). Judge Bartlett was
known to be unsympathetic to a claim of this sort. He was the sole dissenter in Health
Dep't v. Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895), where the New York
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by the then Judge Peckham, upheld the constitutionality of a law requiring owners of tenement houses to furnish at least one water spigot
on each floor.
75. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra. Judge Bartlett felt that the
statute proposed too great a change, as is indicated by the following remarks:
The country miller of fifty years ago who passed a long and happy life amid the
hum of machinery and the grinding process of the upper and nether stones, little
dreamed of a coming day when the legislature, in the full panoply of paternalism,
would rescue his successor from the appalling dangers of the life he led until old
age summoned him to retire.
177 N.Y. at 188; 69 N.E. at 389.
76. Brief for Defendant in Error.
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ingly long hours of work in bake-shops properly conducted under
the sanitary rules
provided for by the provisions of the bakery
77
inspection laws.

In other words, baking under the proper conditions was not an unhealthy occupation. Therefore, reasonable exercise of the police power
should look to such conditions of work and not to the hours of labor.
In terms of health, the appellant contended, hours simply amounted to
an insignificant variable, and therefore, to an unreasonable application
of the police power.7
D. Composition and Philosophy of the Court
The ultimate resolution of the Lochner litigation by the Supreme
Court, -in all probability, had much to do with the affixing of a laissezfaire label to the Court during this period. To a degree the label is accurate, for most of the Justices were generally sympathetic to the tenents of
economic individualism - some more so than others.7" It would have
been unusual had the contrary been true, for this was the dominant
single body of economic thought in the last third of the 19th century. 0
Like so many labels, however, this one conceals some of the truth.
Despite the fact that a bare majority failed to approve the hours
limit for bakers, the Court was, on the whole, tolerant of state exercises
77. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 60.
78. Id. The defendant's argument may have carried added weight because of the
efforts of Henry Weismann, Lochner's counsel in the United States Supreme Court.
Weismann had formerly been a journeyman baker and had become active in the labor
movement in New York. In 1895, as editor of The Baker's Journal, he had led the
drive which culminated successfully in the passage of the statute now under review.
Weismann later became a master baker, studied law, and was admitted to the bar.
In 1904, he was engaged by the State Association of Master Bakers to advance
Lochner's case beyond the New York Court of Appeals; he later acknowledged that
he had come to believe that the law for which he labored was a mistake. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 19, 1905, at 1, col. 3.
It is difficult to determine whether Weismann's participation as counsel influenced the Lochner Court. It is quite likely, however, that his unique background
was known to the Justices, since Weismann was admitted to the Supreme Court bar
pro hoc vice. C.

BUTLER,

A

CENTURY AT THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

171 (1942).
A second factor which may have affected the outcome of Lochner in the
Supreme Court was Justice McKenna's background. His father was a baker, and
although there is no record of any reference Justice McKenna may have made to
his childhood in a baker's home, it seems probable that his youth had some bearing
on his attitude toward state regulation, at least in this instance. Justice McKenna
later came to accept legislation of the sort he had voted to invalidate in Lochner.
M. McDEvTT, JOSEPH McKENNA: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 138
(1946). As a point of interest, Justice McKenna concurred with the five-member
majority upholding the 8-hour workday for railroad employees in Wilson v. New,
243 U.S. 332 (1917).
79. See tables I-IV infra.
80. R. GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 151-64.
UNITED STATES
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of the police power. One may argue that politically a broad indulgence
was necessary to forestall successive attacks on the judicial fortress.
Indeed, there were some who were persuaded that the national interest
demanded a disarming of the judiciary by removing, or at least severely
curtailing, the power of judicial review."1 That real limits exist to the
uses of judicial review cannot be doubted, but it is submitted that those
limits had not been reached before Lochner. Rather, the pattern of
Supreme Court decisions during that period reveals a widespread sufferance for most applications of the police power. To restate a major
theme of this article, Lochner was significant because of the farreaching nature of the change it proposed.
Membership on the Supreme Court was relatively stable in the
several years preceding Lochner. In fact, between 1898 and 1905, only
two Justices departed; Justices Gray and Shiras were replaced in 1902
and 1903 by Justices Holmes and Day respectively. In the years
1898 through 1902, when the Court consisted of Chief Justice Fuller
and Justices Gray, Shiras, McKenna, Brown, White, Harlan, Peckham
and Brewer, some 69 cases were decided which turned on the limits
of the state police power, broadly defined. 2 Of this number, 49 were
decided without a dissent,8 3 and 20 were decided by a divided court.8 4
Of the 69 cases, 14 (20%) declared the state regulations in question an
unconstitutional exercise of state police power. It is within the 20
cases where a division is recorded that some interesting differences
among the Justices appear.
81. For illustrations of the arguments posed by those who would seek to limit
the scope of judicial review, see materials cited in note 9 supra.

82. Police power is defined, for the purposes of this analysis, as the power inherent in each state to prescribe such reasonable rules for the conduct of its citizens
and residents, and regulations for the use of private property, as are necessary for
the welfare of the public. This power is, of course, limited by the requirement that

the regulation not conflict with rights secured by the state and federal constitutions.

The term "connotes the time-tested conceptual limit of public encroachment upon

private interests." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
At the turn of the century, individualism and the sanctity of private property
dominated the social philosophy; it was thought that the state existed primarily to
protect property rights. R. GABRIEL, supra note 28, at 157-58, 168. It is submitted
that this social philosophy affected to some extent the judiciary's consideration of the
scope of the police power. The tables provided herein are an attempt to measure the
influence of this philosophy upon the individual members of the Court. It should be
noted, however, that several of the cases cited in the tables involved issues collateral
to the issue of whether the state's exercise of police power was valid. For example,
the case may have involved issues of standing and ripeness, and an individual justice's

vote may reflect his thoughts on one of these collateral issues. The justices did not
write separate opinions with great frequency during this period, and it was common

for the justices, when dissenting, to do so without opinion. Thus, it is difficult to
pinpoint the exact ground for each of the justice's decisions.
83. See Appendix I.
84. See Appendix II.
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TABLE 1

Justices

Percentages of votes upholding
exercise of police power in 20
cases decided by a divided Court
in the years 1898-1902

Gray
Fuller
McKenna
Shiras
Harlan
Brown
White
Brewer
Peckham

100 (20)
80(16)
75 (15)
70 (14)
70(14)
55 (11)
55 (11)
35 (7)
25 5) n=20

Of the 69 such cases decided during this period, 22 involved property rights or contract rights questions. Eight of these 22 cases were
decided by a divided court,85 and 4 of the 22 (18%) invalidated state
regulatory legislation. Among the eight cases in which the Court was
divided, reactions, of individual Justices are reported in table II below.
TABLE II

Justices

Percentages of votes upholding exercise
of state police power in 8 cases involving
property rights or contract rights questions decided by a divided Court in the
years 1898-1902

Gray
Fuller
McKenna
White
Brown
Shiras
Harlan
Brewer
Peckham

100
88
75
75
62
62
62
25
0

(8)
(7)
(6)
(6)
(5)
(5)
(5)
(2)
(0) n=8

In the period from 1903 through 1906, when Justices Holmes and
Day had replaced Justices Gray and Shiras, the number of cases raising
shallenges to an exercise of state police power rose to 96, 62 of which
85. See Appendix III.
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were decided by a unanimous Court.8 6 Thirty-four of these were decided
by a divided Court,8 7 and of the 96, 33 (34%) held the particular regulations invalid. The individual voting differences appear below in
table III.
TABLE III

Justices

Percentages of votes upholding exercise
of state police power in 34 cases decided
by a divided Court in the years 1903-1906

Holmes
White
Day
Fuller
Harlan
McKenna
Brown
Peckham
Brewer

76
70
68
65
64
62
50
44
26

(26)
(23)*
(23)
(22)
(21)*
(21)
(17)
(15)
( 9) n=:34

Voted in 33 cases only.

Of the 96, 29 raised the more particular issues of property rights
88
and the contract clause. Of these, 14 were decided by a divided court,
and in four (12%) the legislation was held unconstitutional. Again,
there were sharp differences among the Justices.
TABLE IV

*

Justices

Percentages of votes upholding exercise
of state police power in 14 cases involving
property rights or contract rights questions decided by a divided Court in the
years 1903-1906

Harlan
Holmes
White
Day
McKenna
Brown
Fuller
Peckham

93
93
92
86
86
71
64
29

Brewer

14 (n--

(n--13)
(n==13)
(n--12)*
(n--12)
(n--12)
(n--10)
(n-- 9)
(n-- 4)
2)

Voted in 13 cases only.

86. See Appendix IV.
87. See Appendix V.
88. See Appendix VI.
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The tables are revealing. On the issue of state police power
generally, in tables I and III, there was a substantial increase in litigation in the years 1903-1906 over the years 1898-1902. The increase
is somewhat more notable since the former period is the shorter of the
two. Moreover, as the volume of such litigation increased, the Court
as a whole became less tolerant of the manifestations of the state police
power which found their way to the High Bench, although the great
majority of regulatory legislation met with judicial approval. Moreover, as tables II and IV indicate, constitutional approbation of restrictions on property rights and intrusions upon liberty of contract
was actually above that for the more general police power category.
The record is admittedly the product of a property-conscious Court, but
hardly of an aggressively hostile one.
The tables also reveal that certain Justices tended to be far more
inclined -than others to uphold legislation enacted under the state police
power. Justices Brewer and Peckham seemed most consistently disdainful of such statutes. Justices Holmes and White were most often
at the other end of the spectrum, with Justice Day not far behind.
Chief Justice Fuller became far less tolerant from the first period to
the second. Justices Harlan, McKenna and Brown assumed a moderate
stance.8 9 The figures in table IV are especially interesting because
the first four Justices comprised the Lochner minority and the remaining five the majority. While the tables do not fix exact positions, they
do suggest the tendencies of the individual members of the Court to
vote for or against state regulatory attempts. They also suggest that
for most Justices the cases presented some very hard questions.
Henry Billings Brown bears some examination in this respect.
Justice Brown wrote the opinion of the Court in the Holden case,"0
upholding the Utah mining statute, yet voted with the majority to
89. Justice Brewer had once said, "The philosophy of Plato and Herbert Spencer
is man's wisdom." Address by Justice Brewer, in Garner, Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REv. 615, 632
n.70 (1965). As for Justice Peckham, a contemporary of his noted that he "seems
to take an a priori pleasure in a reversal, and his opinions toward that direction seem
to have more vim than when he sustains." Hall, The New Supreme Court Justice,
8 GREEN BAG 1, 2 (1896).
Justice Harlan's moderate stance has been clarified in recent literature.
[Justice Harlan] combined a passionate desire to vindicate the civil rights of
blacks with a reverence for private property. He often opposed economic regulation by the states, but generally tolerated it when undertaken by the federal
government. He had no affinity for the reform ideologies of the late nineteenth
century . . . . Yet he joined supporters of those movements in railing against
and attempting to regulate the giant industrial enterprises of the period. Harlan's
model of judging . . . bound a judge only to his own intuitive sense of what
was right.
White, John Marshall Harlan I: The Precursor,19 Am. J. LEG. HIST. 1, 5-6 (1975).
90. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
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void the hours limit for bakers in Lochner. In the several tables
measuring the individual propensity to validate exercises of the police
power, he was ranked more or less towards the center. Justice Brown
realized the need for protection of property interests, but was equally
willing to acknowledge the state's role in improving the general condition of its citizenry. His address on the "Distribution of Property" to
the American Bar Association in 1893 might be said to exemplify this
duality of feeling which very probably was felt by most of his colleagues.
On the one hand, he declared:
While enthusiasts may picture to us an ideal state of society where
neither riches nor poverty shall exist, wherein all shall be comfortably housed and clad ... such a Utopia is utterly inconsistent
with human character as at present constituted . . . . Rich men
are essential even to the well-being of the poor ....
One has but

to consider for a moment the immediate consequences of the
abolition of large private fortunes to appreciate the danger which
lurks in any radical disturbance of the present social system. 91
However, in the very same address, he queried:
Does it therefore follow that legislation can do nothing to improve
those [labor-capital] relations, or to palliate the evils of the present
situation? I think not. [The state] may fix the number of hours
of a legal day's work, provide that payment be made at certain
stated periods, protect the life and health of the workingman
against accidents or diseases arising from ill-constructed machinery,
badly ventilated rooms, defective appliances or dangerous occupations, and may limit or prohibit altogether the labor of women
and children in employments injurious to their health or beyond
their strength.2
This address, predating Lochner by more than a dozen years,
highlights the ambivalence with which the overriding legal question
of the day was approached. The voting patterns of the years 1898-1906
suggest that most of Justice Brown's colleagues entertained similar
feelings."
III.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Lochner illustrates the dilemma of altering constitutional theory
in order to accommodate an evolving public policy as well as any other
case of the period. Political, economic, and judicial traditions were
91. Brown, The Distribution of Property, 16 REP. Am. BAR Assoc. 213, 218-19

(1893).
92. Id. at 235-36.
93. See A.

PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF

BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, 84 (1960).
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in the throes of transition. The transition consisted of a series of
modifications which in time twisted the traditions beyond recognition.
Lochner was a celebrated case principally because the policy embodied
within the statute was perceived as effectively undercutting those traditions. It is submitted that for political and ideological reasons, more
than anything else, a majority of the Justices surveyed the proposed
change and found it wanting in constitutional support.
The case offers several conclusions about the role of the Supreme
Court in constitutional change. First, when a case presents an issue
where at least one possible resolution would effect a change in public
policy, one must determine the degree of potential change the litigation
represents. It is axiomatic that a small adjustment in policy is more
easily adopted than a major overhaul. To the degree that a particular
resolution of a case requires the former, the change will more probably
be made.
Second, one must explore the dimensions and the depth of the
varieties of constitutional interpretation present on the Court. Is the
proposed change in some way antagonistic to a dominant constitutional
tradition? A Supreme Court decision which amounts to a significant
policy change, after all, might be relatively unencumbered with improbabilities if the change in policy does not sharply conflict with
strongly held constitutional beliefs. For example, the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' was itself a pronounced
change in policy - a substantial intrusion into private choice. Yet, the
change could be easily harmonized with the existing constitutional
theory of the commerce clause95 - far easier, for instance, ,than 'had the
legitimization been possible solely through a redefinition of the fourteenth amendment. 6
Furthermore, Lochner demonstrates that particular arguments presented to the Court can be critical to the outcome of litigation. The
hours limit for bakers could have been accommodated within the tradition of economic individualism had the majority been prepared to view
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. (1970).
95. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
96. The commerce clause had been interpreted by the Court as allowing federal
regulation of those intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1936). The Court's utilization of the commerce clause to prohibit discrimination on the ground that such discrimination would have a harmful effect upon interstate travel and interstate sale of
goods was, therefore, not a departure from precedent. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
The fourteenth amendment, however, had been interpreted as applicable only
to state action. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The use of the amendment as
the basis of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's Public Accommodation Section would therefore have entailed a sharp change in judicial policy.
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the statute as an additional safeguard for workers in hazardous occupations. This accommodation might not have been persuasive for long
before it became apparent that a far greater number of vocations could
resort to government intervention on their behalf on the same grounds,
but it would have been an acceptable piece of patchwork for the short
run. At least for the Supreme Court, the statute was never really
defended in terms which could have placed it within that tradition.
Rather, by inference and by assertions of counsel for Joseph Lochner
the statute stood out in variance with that tradition.
Finally, the stake in approving a proposed change and, conversely,
the interest in maintaining the status quo, as perceived by the Justices,
cannot be overlooked. The majority in Lochner perhaps sensed a tide
moving against them. They were not ignorant of the surging growth
of organized labor in the country9 7 and must have been aware of the
fact that the statute represented a legislative triumph for the labor
movement in New York. They could not have been unmindful of the
increased support the Socialist Party was receiving,98 nor were they
encouraged by the symbolic defeat of the conservative Judge Parker
as the Democratic presidential candidate the preceding year. Yet, the
Lochner court could not have been expected to foresee the extent of
anti-Court sentiment their decision would spur. It was rather as if
they were defending a position from an attack which in their eyes
would shortly pass. Prescience must be a goal not distant from any
court's consciousness as it gropes for the continuing accommodation between norms and policy.
97. Membership in the American Federation of Labor climbed from 278,000 in

1898 to 1,676,000 in 1905. H.

FAULKNER, THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

1898-1914,

53 (1931).
98. Eugene Debs' Socialist vote in presidential elections rose from 94,000 in 1900
to 402,000 in 1904. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 41, at 240.
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